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Abstract
In this paper, I develop a North-South pure exchange model to ex-
plain transfers between asymmetric countries. Two theories are investigated:
ﬁrstly, I consider the theory of trade agreements; contrary to conventional
wisdom, an eﬃcient trade agreement (ETA) does not necessarily lead to
free trade in the absence of internal political economy distortions. In fact,
the ETA between asymmetric countries is such that the South sets a tariﬀ
higher than its Nash tariﬀ and the North subsidizes its imports. When the
diﬀerence in the endowment size is very large, the South's welfare gain is
insuﬃcient to compensate for the North's welfare loss. Interestingly enough,
free trade always dominates the trade war equilibrium, regardless of coun-
tries' endowments. Secondly, I consider the theory of optimal tariﬀs and
foreign aid. To encourage the South to liberalize trade, the North makes a
transfer to the South - which increases with the countries' size asymmetry.
To test this prediction, I use ACP-EU aid data and ﬁnd that an increase
in the recipient countries' relative size reduces foreign aid transfers. The
present analysis provides a theoretical framework to understand the tran-
sition from the privileged market access to ACP-EU economic partnership
agreements (EPAs) involving reciprocal trade concessions and the role of the
adjustment transfers in this process.
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1 Introduction
Trade relationships between asymmetric countries often involve transfers. In the
international trade literature, a transfer takes on various meanings. It means
foreign aid when a donor gives ﬁnancial or material resources to boost economic
development and welfare in a recipient country, to help the poor or to promote its
exports. In trade agreement models, a transfer represents the payment made by a
country to its trading partner either because signing the agreement induces a loss
for the partner, or because of a violation of the agreement, namely the application
of a higher tariﬀ. In this paper, I use a pure exchange model à la Kennan and
Riezman (1988) to analyze diﬀerent trade situations that involve these types of
transfers and study how asymmetry in the endowment size aﬀect the outcomes.
When studying transfers, one naturally considers foreign aid. In the very large
aid literature, foreign aid serves various objectives, notably economic and political
interests of donors. In fact, the transfer paradox literature introduced by Brecher
and Bhagwati (1982) shows that a donor can be better and a recipient worse oﬀ
as a result of foreign aid. Regarding the economic self-interest motive of giving, a
donor country can tie its aid to the obligation by the recipient country to purchase
goods that it produces.1 Several empirical studies point to the fact that foreign
aid promotes donor exports in the recipient countries (Nilsson, 1997; Martinez-
Zarzoso, Nowak-Lehmann and Klasen, 2010; Nowak-Lehmann, Martinez-Zarzoso,
Cardozo, Herzer and Klasen, 2009; Osei, Morrissey and Lloyd, 2004). However, the
positive relationship between aid and donor exports not only reﬂects the practice of
tying aid to donor imports, but also the goodwill or the recipient loyalty towards
the donor exports (Arvin and Baum, 1977).
In trade agreement (TA) models, a transfer sometimes refers to the compensa-
tion payment intended to oﬀset a loss resulting from a commercial arrangement.
In fact, a free trade agreement (FTA) between countries of asymmetric size is
usually known to be detrimental for a large country and beneﬁcial to the small
country. It follows from this that the small country has to make a side payment if
the FTA is to be incentive compatible (Bond and Park, 2002; Park, 2000; Konishi,
Kowalczyk and Sjostrom, 2003; Kowalczyk, 2006). This side payment is usually
non-monetary in nature and consists of the adoption of regulations and values
dear to the large country (democracy, environment protection, governance, sound
investment code, protection of intellectual property rights (IPRs) to name a few;
see Balleix, 2010; Bond and Park, 2002; Chauﬀour and Maur, 2011; Hoekman and
Saggi, 2007; Limão, 2007). A major diﬀerence between the two types of transfers
1Aid conditionality takes on various forms: aid can be linked to democracy, human rights,
governance performance of recipients, poverty reduction strategies (Rich, 2004), trade policy
reform and speciﬁcally the reduction of tariﬀs in recipient countries (Lahiri, Raimondos-Møller,
Wong and Woodland, 2002; Lahiri and Raimondos-Møller, 1997; Morrissey, 1993).
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is not only their respective nature but also the direction of the payment: indeed,
foreign aid is often given by the larger country to the small one, contrary to this
compensation payment which is paid by the small country to the large one for
access to its large market.
Finally, a transfer also means the ﬁnancial compensation (ﬁnes or bonds) that
a country infringing a trade agreement pays to its trading partner. Although
possible only with the consent of the non-complying country, this compensatory
measure is preferable to tariﬀ retaliation. By retaliating the aggrieved country
does shoot itself in the foot by impeding imports and thus harming its domestic
consumers and/or importers (Bronckers and Van Den Broek, 2005). Limão and
Saggi (2008, 2011) prove the existence of weakly renegotiation proof (WRP) ﬁnes
and bonds that are equivalent to tariﬀ retaliation in an inﬁnitely repeated game.
In this paper, I develop a North-South pure exchange model to understand
various types of transfers and the inﬂuence of countries' size on the amount and the
pattern of transfer between commercial partners. The contribution of this paper
to the international trade literature is fourfold. Firstly, I show that an eﬃcient
trade agreement (ETA) does not necessarily lead to free trade.2 In the presence
of asymmetry in endowment size, the ETA is such that the South sets a tariﬀ
higher than its Nash tariﬀ and the North subsidizes its imports. Since the North
is always worse oﬀ and the South better oﬀ, the ETA is unlikely to occur unless the
North gets compensated for its loss. However, when the asymmetry in endowment
size is high enough, the South's utility gain is not suﬃcient to compensate for the
North's utility loss. Interestingly enough, free trade always dominates the trade
war equilibrium, regardless of the countries' endowments. Secondly, on the self-
enforcement of an FTA, I ﬁnd that the WRP ﬁnes are higher for the South than
for the North and increase with the size asymmetry for both countries. Moreover,
the North's critical discount factor increases with the diﬀerence in endowment
size while the South's respectively decreases. This result suggests that a large
country has to be more patient than its small commercial partner before reaping
the beneﬁts of an FTA. The ﬁnding is in fact very intuitive: an FTA gives the
small country (the South) immediate access to the large country's market (the
North) in exchange for reforms which take time to be put in place and to produce
results. Thirdly, I consider the theory of optimal tariﬀs and foreign aid. In a
Nash bargaining game, foreign aid serves as an incentive to the South to liberalize
trade; it turns out that the amount of the transfer increases with countries' size
asymmetry. Finally, I test this prediction with EU-ACP aid data; I ﬁnd that an
increase in recipient countries' relative size = measured as the ratio of the recipient
income to the donor income = reduces aid allocation considerably. The coeﬃcient
2A trade agreement is eﬃcient if it maximizes the sum of countries' welfares; Bagwell and
Staiger (2001) show that free trade is eﬃcient in the absence of a political economy parameter.
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of this variable is much more higher than the recipient income often used in the
aid literature.
The present work is related to three strands of the trade and transfer literature.
The ﬁrst one is the trade agreement literature. According to Bagwell and Staiger
(1999, 2001), tariﬀ negotiation between symmetric countries seeks a reciprocal
liberalization which will increase trade volumes and welfare in both countries.
On the contrary, Bond and Park (2002, BP) and Park (2000) show that a trade
agreement is not mutually beneﬁcial to asymmetric countries as the small country
gains, while the large one looses. Mayer (1981) and Chongbunwatana (2004) ﬁnd
that a tariﬀ negotiation between a small and a large country does not lead to a
reciprocal liberalization but to a large number of equilibria such that the large
country chooses a lower tariﬀ and the small country grants import subsidies. In
this article, I ﬁnd the opposite result: the ETA between asymmetric countries
is unique and entails an import subsidy by the large country (the North) and
an higher import tariﬀ by the small one (the South).3 Contrary to Kennan and
Riezman (1988) and Chongbunwatana (2004), free trade dominates the trade war
equilibrium for all possible endowments.4 Therefore, no transfer is made in free
trade, which is eﬃcient only in the case of symmetric countries.
This study is also related to a second strand which addresses optimal tariﬀs and
foreign aid. Lahiri and Raimondos-Møller (1997, hereafter, LR) prove, in a three-
country two-good trade model, that an international transfer tied to tariﬀ changes
in the recipient country can be welfare-improving for all three trading partners. In
fact, the recipient beneﬁts from the direct revenue eﬀect of the transfer, while both
the donor and the third country experience a terms-of-trade increase if they both
are exporters of the recipient's import good. Using a two-country two good trade
mode, Lahiri, Raimondos-Møller, Wong and Woodland (2002, hereafter, LRWW)
conclude that it is optimal for a donor to make a transfer to a recipient if it induces
the latter to liberalize trade.5 In these models, the rationale of development aid is
to compensate the recipient for the loss of tariﬀ revenue due to trade liberalization.
In most (least) developing countries, the informal economy amounts up to three
quarters of the GDP (Gordon and Li, 2005) and governments heavily rely on them
(Gallagher, 2008); tariﬀ revenues are a very important source of income. In this
article, I derive explicit solutions in terms of the model's parameters (countries'
endowment), instead implicit solutions in terms of elasticities as in LR (1997) and
3These authors ﬁnd multiple equilibria by using either a graphical analysis (Mayer) or Nash
bargaining (Chongbunwatana); the unique solution found in this paper stems from maximizing
the sum of both countries' utilities.
4I reach an opposite result owing to the fact that I use a Stone-Geary utility function, while
the authors use the Cobb-Douglas one.
5To the best of my knowledge, LR (1997) and LRWW (2002) are the ﬁrst to study the
optimality of giving aid in trade models.
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LRWW (2002). Following these authors, I consider various scenarios: neither in a
simultaneous nor in a two-stage game it is optimal for the North to make a transfer
to the South. However, foreign aid provides an incentive to the South to liberalize
trade in a Nash bargaining game.
This analysis is also related to a third strand which deals with the determinants
of aid allocation and trade. On the one hand, the aid literature shows that aid
allocation is inﬂuenced by the recipient needs, measured by their GDP per capita
(Feeny and McGillivray, 2008; Younas, 2008). On the other hand, the empirical
trade literature shows that foreign aid and countries' income have a positive impact
on trade. In my analysis, I introduce a new variable to measure the relative size
of recipients. It is computed as the ratio of the GDP per capita the aid recipient
to that of the donor. This variable is negatively associated with aid but positively
with trade in both directions.
The present analysis provides a theoretical framework to understand the tran-
sition from the privileged market access to ACP-EU economic partnership agree-
ments (EPAs) involving reciprocal trade concessions and the role of the adjustment
transfers in this process. Since the ACP-EU Lomé conventions and despite being
among the most protected markets, the ACP countries were granted trade prefer-
ences by the EU until the end of the Cotonou agreement in 2007.6 This last treaty
brought in the principle of reciprocity involving the ACPs giving more trade con-
cessions to their European partners. By so doing, ACP-EU arrangements became
more in line with WTO regulations. Given the importance of the EU for ACP
trade, some countries are likely to lose important tariﬀ revenue from cutting down
tariﬀs on imports (Hinkle and Schiﬀ, 2004; Fontagné, Laborde and Mitonitonne,
2011). To facilitate this transition towards a free trade which beneﬁts both com-
mercial partners7, ﬁnancial mechanisms are to be set in place to address speciﬁc
EPA related adjustment costs (European Research Oﬃce, 2007).
Finally, this paper shows that a large country beneﬁts stems from either non-
trade issues linked to the agreement or direct trade gains. It is empirically observed
that free trade is also economically beneﬁcial to large countries, as it provides
them with better access to raw materials, which are essential for the sustainable
functioning of modern societies (European commission, 2008). In fact, the EU
relies heavily on imports of high-tech metals for which Africa and South America,
to name a few, are leading suppliers. Given the presence of competitors like China
or India, the ACP-EU EPAs can be perceived as an instrument of the EU raw
6This treaty signed in 1975 is actually an expansion of the 1963's ﬁrst Yaoundé convention
between the Europe and the French-speaking African countries to include the United Kingdom
and English-speaking countries of the Paciﬁc ocean and the Caribbean islands.
7Estimating the welfare eﬀects of interim EPAs, Vollmer, Martínez-Zarzoso, Nowak-Lehmann
and Klann (2009) ﬁnd that only a small number of countries signiﬁcantly beneﬁt from the agreed
liberalization agenda, while others experience a marginal welfare gain.
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material diplomacy whose aim is to secure access to raw materials by eliminating
export restrictions (Ramdoo, 2011).
The remainder of this article is as follows. Section 2 presents the model and the
theoretical results. Section 2.1 introduces the pure exchange model. Section 2.2
analyzes trade agreements and compensating transfers. Section 2.3 deals with the
self-enforcement of trade agreements and ﬁnancial transfers. Section 2.4 presents
the optimal choice of transfer in three scenarios (simultaneous, two-stage game
and Nash bargaining). Section 3 presents the empirical test of the model using
ACP-EU foreign aid data. Finally, section 4 concludes.
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2 The Model
2.1 The Economic Environment
Consider a static pure exchange model in the spirit of Kennan and Riezman (1988)
between which two countries, the North (without *) and the South (with *), trad-
ing two goods, x and y. The North gives an amount of foreign aid, T , to the
South. Consumers in both countries have identical preferences represented by the
Stone-Geary function8:
u(x, y) =
(
1 + x(∗)E
) (
1 + y(∗)E
)
(1)
where x(∗)E and y(∗)E are each country's consumption of x and y.
The world endowment for each good is normalized to 1 and each country is
initially endowed with both goods. The endowment structure is as follows: the
North has 1− γ of units x and µ of y, while the South has γ units of x and 1− µ
of y. Since 0.5 < γ ≤ µ ≤ 1, the North (resp. the South) has a comparative
advantage in y (resp. x) and that the South is either of equal size or a smaller
country than the North .9 The parameters γ and µ capture countries' relative size
so that | µ− γ | measures the countries' asymmetry in endowment size.
Assume that both countries apply ad-valorem tariﬀs τx and τ
∗
y respectively (for
notational ease, I use t = 1 + τx and s = 1 + τ
∗
y hereafter). Considering that the
tariﬀ proceeds and the international transfer payment is distributed to Southern
consumers in a lump-sum fashion, the countries' budget constraints can be written
as:
The North
tpx(1− γ) + pyµ+ (t− 1) pxZx = I (2)
tpxx
E + pyy
E = I − T (3)
The South
pxγ + spy(1− µ) + (s− 1) pyZy = I∗ (4)
8Contrary to Kennan and Riezman (1988) where consumer preferences have a Cobb-Douglas
(CD) form, the present paper uses a Stone-Geary (SG) function, under which both countries
are better oﬀ under free trade. Moreover, Nash tariﬀs exist when λ = µ = 1, while they are
undeﬁned with CD utilities in KR.
9The assumption captures the fact that aid dependent countries are always poorer than the
donors; I allow for both countries to be of the same size for comparison purposes.
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pxx
∗E + spyy∗E = I∗ + T (5)
where I and I∗ are the consumer incomes, which are given by their endowments
of x and y valued at their domestic prices10 and where Zx, Zy are imports of good
x by the North and imports of good y by the South in the ﬁrst period, respectively.
Equations (2) and (4) above respectively give the North's and the South's in-
comes as functions of their endowments (IF). Owing to the transfer, the North
(the South) consumes less (more) than it can aﬀord with its revenue. This is
shown by expenditure functions (EF) (3) and (4). Both countries' trade expen-
diture functions (T E) are as follows: T E = EF − IF = T for the North and
T E∗ = EF∗ − IF∗ = −T for the South.
This completes the presentation of the pure exchange model. Before turning
to the trade analysis, I ﬁrst determine equilibrium consumptions in both countries
and quantities traded.
Equilibrium consumption and trade
The problem of the Northern representative consumer is to choose consumption
bundle (x, y) to maximize its utility given by (1) subject to the budget constraint
(3). The Lagrangian is formulated as follows:
L (x, y, λ) = u (x, y) + λIF (x , y) (6)
Since x and y are the objects of choice, the ﬁrst-order conditions (FOCs) of
the Lagrangian are
∂L (x, y, λ)
∂x
= 1 + yE − λtpx = 0 (7)
∂L (x, y, λ)
∂y
= 1 + xE − λpy = 0 (8)
Rearranging both expressions and dividing (7) by (8) gives:
10Because of import tariﬀs, domestic prices of imported goods
(
px =, p
∗
y
)
are higher than the
corresponding international prices
(
p∗x = p
w
x ; py = p
w
y
)
, so that px = tp
∗
x
and py = sp
∗
y.
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1 + yE
1 + xE
=
tpx
py
(9)
Likewise, consumer optimization in the South implies:
1 + y∗E
1 + x∗E
=
px
spy
(10)
Following KR (1988), I ﬁnd the quantities traded in equilibrium. Let Zi denote
the volume of trade for good i ∈ {x, y}; if Zi < 0 (Zj > 0), then the country
exports (imports) good i (j). Assuming γ > 1
2
and µ > 1
2
leads to the following
trade pattern: the North (the South) imports good x (y) and exports good y
(x). Therefore, I can write xE = 1 − γ + Zx , yE = µ − Zy, x∗E = γ − Z∗x and
y∗E = 1−µ+Z∗y . Putting these expressions into (9) and (10) brings the following
system of equations{
tpx [1 + (1− γ + Zx)] = py [1 + (µ− Zy)]
px [1 + (γ − Z∗x)] = spy
[
1 +
(
1− µ+ Z∗y
)] (11)
To solve the system (11), I ﬁrst ﬁnd the trade balance equation by subtracting
(3) from (2) and (5) from (4):
px(1− γ − xE︸ ︷︷ ︸
Zx<0
) + py(µ− yE︸ ︷︷ ︸
Zy>0
) = T
px(γ − x∗E︸ ︷︷ ︸
Z∗x>0
) + py(1− µ− y∗E︸ ︷︷ ︸
Z∗y<0
) = −T (12)
Let x be the numéraire good so that px = 1; since trade is balanced, isolating
py from each equation in (12) conveys the same result
py =
Zx + T
Zy
(13)
Substituting the expression of py into (11) and assuming that trade is balanced
(Zx = Z
∗
x and Zy = Z
∗
y ), the system of equations becomes{
tZy [1 + (1− γ + Zx)] = (Zx + T ) [1 + (µ− Zy)]
Zy [1 + (γ − Zx)] = s (Zx + T ) [1 + (1− µ+ Zy)]
(14)
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The solution to the system of equations (14) is given by
ZEx =
1− 3sT − 4st− γ [st(µ− 2)− µ− 1] + µ+ 2stµ
1 + 3s+ µ+ st (2− µ) (15)
ZEy =
1 + µ+ 2st (µ− 2) + T [1− st(µ− 2) + µ] + γ [(1− st(µ− 2) + µ)]
1 + T + γ + 3t+ st (2− T − γ) (16)
In each country , equilibrium consumptions of x, y are respectively
for the North
xE = 1− γ + ZEx = 2(1+µ)+3s(1−γ−T )+st(µ−2)1+3s+µ+st(2−µ)
yE = µ− ZEy = 3tµ−1−γ−T+2st(2−γ−T )1+γ+T+3t+st(2−γ−T )
for the South
x∗E = γ − ZEx = 3s(γ+T )−1−µ+2st(2−µ)1+3s+µ−st(2−µ)
y∗E = 1− µ+ ZEy = 2(1+γ+T )+3t(1−µ)+st(γ+T−2)1+γ+T+3t+st(2−T−γ)
Now that equilibrium consumption and trade are determined, diﬀerent situa-
tions leading to transfers between countries can be studied. Let us start with a
welfare analysis; section 2.1 compares countries' utilities under a trade war to their
utility levels under an eﬃcient trade agreement (ETA). Results show that, in the
presence of size asymmetry, the South makes a utility transfer to the North for
the ETA to be incentive compatible. Section 2.2 builds upon the optimal tariﬀs
and transfers literature. Three scenarios are considered: a simultaneous game of
foreign aid and tariﬀs, a two-stage game where aid is chosen in the ﬁrst stage and
tariﬀs in the second stage; and ﬁnally, a Nash-Bargaining negotiation over the
amount of aid and the South's tariﬀ, assuming that the North applies a unilateral
free-trade policy. Section 2.3 deals with the self-enforcement of free trade, where
transfers .
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2.2 Trade war, eﬃcient trade agreement and transfers
In this section, I do a welfare analysis, which compares the trade war equilibrium
to the eﬃcient trade agreement. In what follows, I model the trade war as a non-
cooperative international tariﬀ setting game, where T = 0. To determine trade
war utilities, I ﬁrst ﬁnd countries' optimal tariﬀs; inserting
(
x¯E, y¯E
)
into (1), the
consumer optimization program in the North becomes
maxu
t
(x, y) = (1 +
2 (1 + µ) + 3s (1− γ) + st (µ− 2)
1 + 3s+ µ+ st (2− µ) )︸ ︷︷ ︸
x¯E
(1 +
3tµ− 1− γ + 2st (2− γ)
1 + γ + 3t+ st (2− γ)︸ ︷︷ ︸
y¯E
)
(17)
The FOC of (17) w.r.t t is given by
9 [1 + s (2− γ) + µ]2
[1 + 3s (1− (2− µ) t2) + γ (1 + 3s+ s2t2 (2− µ) + µ)− 2s2t2 (2− µ) + µ] = 0
(18)
Proceeding similarly with the South,
maxu∗
s
(x, y) =
(
1 +
3sγ − 1− µ+ 2st (2− µ)
1 + 3s+ µ− st (2− µ)
)(
1 +
2 (1 + γ) + 3t (1− µ) + st (γ − 2)
1 + γ + 3t+ st (2− γ)
)
(19)
The South's tariﬀ reaction function is
9 [1 + t (2− µ) + γ]2
[1 + 3t (1− 2s2 + µ) + γ (1 + s2t (3 + t (2− µ)) + µ)− 2s2t2 (2− µ) + µ] = 0
(20)
The intersection of the two tariﬀ reaction functions determines the Nash tariﬀs
(denoted by tN and sN). Solving the system of equations (18) and (20) gives11:
sN1 =
(
1 + µ
2− γ
) 1
2
; tN1 =
(
1 + γ
2− µ
) 1
2
(21)
Nash welfares are obtained by inserting
(
sN1 , t
N
1
)
into u(x, y) and u∗(x, y); table
2 gives numerical values of Nash tariﬀ and utilities for diﬀerent values of γ, µ. In
the presence of size asymmetry γ < µ, the outcome is a higher Nash tariﬀ and
utility in the North than the South. This result is reminiscent of Limão and Saggi
11These tariﬀs look very much like KR (1988); the only diﬀerence is that I use a Stone-Geary
utility function, for which Nash tariﬀs exists for a corner solution (γ = µ = 1).
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(2010) who ﬁnd that uncoordinated small countries individually set a lower Nash
tariﬀ than their large trading partner.12
Let us move to the eﬃcient trade agreement, which is such that countries'
tariﬀs maximize the world welfare, W = u (x, y) + u∗ (x, y) (Bagwell and Staiger
1999, 2002). Eﬃcient tariﬀs are found at the intersection of countries' reaction
functions (∂W/∂s and ∂W/∂t) and are respectively given by
sE =
2µ− 1
2γ − 1; t
E =
2γ − 1
2µ− 1 (22)
From (22), it can be easily seen that sE = tE = 1 if γ = µ, that is, the
eﬃcient trade agreement leads to free trade only if the North and the South are
symmetric. Then, both countries are better oﬀ under the ETA than trade war
(table 2). Intuitively, the non-cooperative tariﬀs are ineﬃcient since both countries
can increase their trade volume and thus, their utilities by mutually cutting down
their Nash tariﬀs.
In the case of asymmetry in endowment size (γ < µ), the equilibrium is such
that South imposes a tariﬀ higher than its Nash tariﬀ and the North subsidizes
its imports. Table 2 describes countries' eﬃcient tariﬀs and utilities for diﬀerent
values of γ, µ. Three observations are noteworthy. Firstly, both the North's import
subsidy and the South's tariﬀ increase with the asymmetry in endowment size.
Secondly, countries' welfare levels are equal under eﬃcient tariﬀ and and remain
at 2.250 for all combinations of (λ, µ). Lastly, the North is worse oﬀ under the
ETA than the trade war equilibrium, while the South is better oﬀ. In other words,
the trade war equilibrium dominates the ETA when γ < µ for the North; therefore,
the latter will sign the ETA only if it receives a compensation payment from the
South. Unfortunately, when the size asymmetry in endowment is too large, that
is | γ − µ |≥ 3, the South is unable to compensate the North, since its welfare
gain is smaller than the latter's welfare loss. Formally, u
(
sE, tE
) − u (sN , tN) <|
u∗
(
sE, tE
)− u∗ (sN , tN) | if | γ − µ |≥ 3.
Simulation results presented in table 2 show that both countries gain from
signing an FTA, even though it it is not globally optimal to do so. This result in
very interesting as it brings new insight to the trade agreement literature. In fact,
conventional wisdom often suggests that an FTA is always eﬃcient and entails
transfer when countries are asymmetric. Contrary to KR (1988), both countries
are better oﬀ under an FTA than trade war. Therefore, there is no need for the
12Contrary to our model, they also ﬁnd that small countries' tariﬀs tend to zero if their number
is suﬃciently high and their governments face no political pressures; this implies that free trade
is the optimal policy for a small country lacking market power. This ﬁnding does not render
account of high tariﬀs observed in developing countries. In the present framework, trade is
positive under the following condition γ > 0.5 and µ > 0.5.
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South (the small country) to make a compensation payment to the North (the
large country ), as in Bond and Park (2002) and Park (2000). The table 2 shows
that uN < uFT and u∗N < u∗FT for all γ ≤ µ.
All the above ﬁndings are summarized in the following proposition:
Proposition 1: When the North and the South are symmetric, the ETA leads
to free trade and both countries are better oﬀ (if γ = µ then sE = tE = 1
⇒u (sE, tE) > u (sN , tN) and u∗ (sE, tE) > u∗ (sN , tN)); otherwise, the ETA leads
to an import subsidy in the North and a higher tariﬀ in the South so that the latter
is better oﬀ and the North worse oﬀ than in a trade war situation ( if γ < µ then
sE > sN and tE < 1 ⇒ u (sE, tE) < u (sN , tN) and u∗ (sE, tE) > u∗ (sN , tN)).
To convince the North to sign the ETA, the South makes a compensation payment
when | γ − µ |< 3). For all values of γ, µ, both countries are better oﬀ under free
trade than trade war.
This concludes this section where I have shown that an ETA between asym-
metric countries can involve a compensation payment when the North is worse oﬀ
and the South better oﬀ. Before analyzing a diﬀerent type of transfer, namely
foreign aid, let's see how countries' size inﬂuences the enforcement of an FTA.
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2.3 Self-enforcing free trade agreement
As shown in section 2.2, free trade is not necessarily eﬃcient, but at least every
country is better oﬀ. It is therefore interesting to study the enforcement of an FTA
for diﬀerent levels of countries' endowments. In the absence of a supranational
authority, a trade agreement needs to be self-enforcing; it has been shown that a
repeated interaction helps overcome the prisoner's dilemma (Farrell and Maskin,
1989; Van Damme, 1989). The following analysis heavily draws on Limão and
Saggi (2008, 2010) and Park (2002).
I consider an inﬁnitely repeated game between the North and the South. Recall
that in a trade war, countries' utilities are given by(
uN ≡ u (sN , tN) , u∗N ≡ u∗ (sN , tN)), with sN = tN if γ = µ; under an FTA,
they are given by
(
uFT ≡ u (1, 1) , u∗FT ≡ u∗ (1, 1)). If the North (resp. the
South) deviates and applies its Nash tariﬀ, tN
(
sN
)
, in a period, while its trad-
ing partner sticks to the agreement, its utility in that period is given by uD =
u
(
1, tN
)[
u∗D = u∗
(
sN , 1
)]
.
For simplicity, I consider that cheating induces an inﬁnite tariﬀ war.13 Given
this punishment scheme, Park (2002) shows that each country weighs the (dis-
counted) utility from abiding by the agreement with the (discounted) payoﬀ from
cheating: uFT + δuFT + δ2uFT + ... S uD + δuN + δ2uN + ..., where δ ∈ [0, 1] is the
country's discount factor. This is equivalent to uFT/ (1 + δ) S uD + δuN/ (1 + δ).
Re-arranging this expression brings a critical value of discount parameter, δC =(
uD − uFT ) / (uD − uN), so that for any δ > δC , there will be no cheating, since
the country values the future gains from free trade highly enough.
In what follows, I compute δC for diﬀerent values of the endowments γ, µ.
Simulation results are presented in table 3. When countries are asymmetric, the
North's (resp. the South's) critical discount factor is higher (resp. smaller) than
the South's (resp. the North's). In other words, the North's (resp. the South's)
critical discount factor increases (resp. decreases) with the diﬀerence in endow-
ment size. This ﬁnding suggests that a large country has to be more patient than
its small counterpart to reap the beneﬁts of an FTA. The intuition behind this
result is as follows: an FTA opens up the large country's market (the North) im-
mediately to the small country (the South), while the North has to wait for the
South to implement reforms it committed to. Obviously, reforms are a long process
that takes time to produce results.
13Limão and Saggi (2008, 2010) do not consider a permanent Nash reversion, but a temporary
punishment where the violating country cooperates by applying a free trade policy while its
trading partner sets its tariﬀ at its Nash level. However, they ﬁnd that the lowest cooperative
tariﬀ that is weakly renegotiation proof is equal to the one under permanent trade war. This
brings the critical discount factor, as I do in what follows.
16
Lemma 1: In the presence of asymmetry (| γ − µ |> 0), this inequality δ∗C <
δC always holds; thus, the agreement is self-enforcing if δ∗C < δ∗ < δC < δ. More-
over, the North's (resp. the South's) critical discount factor δC (δ∗C) increases
(decreases) with countries' asymmetry in endowment size| γ − µ |. If γ = µ, then
δC = δ∗C .
Tariﬀ retaliation is not the only means to punish a deviating country to a
trade agreement. Limão and Saggi (2008, 2011) show that monetary ﬁnes are
an equivalent compensation mechanism.14 This is actually the second type of
transfer studied in this paper, when a country violates a trade agreement. In
what follows, I focus on ﬁnes which have to be paid only in case of a violation
of the FTA, contrary to bonds which have to be posted every period before trade
takes place. Limão and Saggi (2011) prove that the maximum WRP ﬁnes cor-
respond to the present discounted value of cooperation in the FTA. Formally,
f =
[
u (1, 1)− u (sN , tN)] / (1− δ) and f ∗ = [u∗ (1, 1)− u∗ (sN , tN)] / (1− δ∗).
Replacing δ and δ∗ respectively by δC and δ∗C , I obtain the maximum ﬁnes fmax
and f ∗max for diﬀerent values of γ, µ (table 3). For both countries, the amount of
ﬁnes increases with the size asymmetry and the ﬁne paid by the South is always
higher than the North for all | γ − µ |> 0. This result is very intuitive: the size
asymmetry confers a greater market power to the North that entitles it to receive
a greater compensation than the South. From lemma 1, it is known that it is
more probable for the South than the North to sign the agreement; thus, when the
South violates the FTA, paying large ﬁnes to the North ensures the continuation
of the FTA. All the above is summarized in the proposition below:
Proposition 2: Let fmax ≡ f (δ = δC) and f ∗max ≡ f ∗ (δ∗ = δ∗C) be the max-
imum WRP ﬁnes. When the North and the South are asymmetric (| γ − µ |> 0),
fmax < f ∗max. If γ = µ, then fmax = f ∗max. For both countries, the amount of
the ﬁnes increases with the asymmetry in endowments.
14As noted by these authors, ﬁnes must voluntarily paid by the violator, while tariﬀs are
imposed by the injured country.
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Table 3: Welfare under defection and their critical discount parameter
Endowments The North cheats The South cheats
γ µ uD u∗D δC fmax uD u∗D δ∗C f∗max
0.6 0.6 2.253 2.246 0.56 0.006 2.246 2.253 0.56 0.006
0.6 0.7 2.410 2.092 0.61 0.0126 2.393 2.109 0.50 0.0128
0.6 0.8 2.575 1.941 0.68 0.022 2.543 1.970 0.45 0.023
0.6 0.9 2.749 1.793 0.75 0.035 2.697 1.837 0.41 0.036
0.6 1.0 2.932 1.645 0.83 0.050 2.855 1.709 0.36 0.053
0.7 0.7 2.263 2.232 0.56 0.023 2.232 2.263 0.56 0.023
0.7 0.8 2.424 2.074 0.61 0.035 2.376 2.121 0.50 0.036
0.7 0.9 2.595 1.918 0.68 0.051 2.522 1.984 0.45 0.052
0.7 1.0 2.774 1.763 0.75 0.069 2.673 1.852 0.41 0.073
0.8 0.8 2.279 2.210 0.56 0.052 2.210 2.279 0.56 0.052
0.8 0.9 2.446 2.046 0.61 0.070 2.349 2.138 0.50 0.071
0.8 1.0 2.622 1.884 0.68 0.092 2.492 2.003 0.45 0.095
0.9 0.9 2.302 2.178 0.55 0.093 2.178 2.302 0.55 0.093
0.9 1.0 2.475 2.008 0.61 0.118 2.314 2.163 0.50 0.120
1.0 1.0 2.332 2.136 0.55 0.149 2.136 2.332 0.55 0.149
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2.4 The Optimal transfer and tariﬀs
2.4.1 Transfer and tariﬀs in a simultaneous game
As in section 2.2, each country sets a tariﬀ to maximize its national welfare, taking
its trading partner's tariﬀ as given; moreover, the North chooses the amount of
transfer to give to the South simultaneously. Contrary to the previous section, the
transfer is not a compensation for a welfare loss due to a trade agreement but it
is unilaterally given by the North under its foreign aid policy.
In this static game, the transfer (foreign aid) does not aﬀect the choice of tariﬀs
as it does in the two-stage game (section 2.4.2). The optimal aid is easily obtained
by maximizing the North's utility function w.r.t T
maxu
T
(x, y) =
(
1 +
2 (1 + µ) + 3s (1− γ − T ) + st (µ− 2)
1 + 3s+ µ+ st (2− µ)
)(
1 +
3tµ− 1− γ − T + 2st (2− γ − T )
1 + γ + T + 3t+ st (2− γ − T )
)
(23)
The f.o.c equals
9t [(T + γ − 2)s− 1− µ]
[(T + γ − 2)s2t− µ− s(4 + T + γ + t (5− µ)− 1] = 0 (24)
Equation (24) yields two solution candidates:
T1 =
1 + µ+ (2− γ) s
s
; T2 =
1 + µ+ (4 + γ) s+ (5− µ) st+ (2− γ) s2t
s (st− 1)
Knowing that the North's total endowment of both goods is 1 − γ + µ < 1.5,
both T1 and T2 are rejected since they largely exceed the North's endowment.
Indeed, susbtituting (21) in T1 gives the following expression
T1 = (1 + µ)
1
2 (2− γ) 12 + (2− γ) > 1.5
To see that 1− γ + µ < 1.5 < T2, replace γ, µ by their possible values. There-
fore, the optimal transfer equals zero. All the above is summarized in the following
proposition:
Proposition 3: In a North-South static game where tariﬀs and the transfer
are chosen simultaneously, it is never optimal for the North to give aid to the South.
The intuition behind this result is straightforward: by giving aid, the North
transfers a part of its wealth, then its utility is lower. Moreover, the Nash tariﬀ
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against its exports in the South negatively aﬀects its utility. Therefore, the Nash
equilibrium is given by
(
sN , tN , T
)
=
((
1 + µ
2− γ
) 1
2
,
(
1 + γ
2− µ
) 1
2
, 0
)
(25)
2.4.2 Transfer and tariﬀs in a two-stage game
Consider a two-stage game in which the North chooses a positive amount of foreign
aid T in the ﬁrst stage, and in the second stage, both commercial partners set their
tariﬀs in a non-cooperative fashion, taking T as given. The f.o.c are respectively
[1 + s (2− γ − T ) + µ]2[
1 + 3s
(
1− 2t2)− 4s2t2 + (γ + T ) (1 + 3s+ s2t2 (2− µ) + µ)+ st2u (2s+ 3) + µ] = 0
(26)
[1 + t (2− µ) + γ + T ]2[
1 + 3t
(
1− 2s2)− 4s2t2 + (γ + T ) (1 + s2t (3 + t (2− µ)) + µ)− 2s2t2 (2− µ) + µ+ tµ (3 + 2s2t)] = 0
(27)
The intersection of the tariﬀ reaction functions determines the Nash tariﬀs
(denoted by sN2 and t
N
2 ). Solving the system of equations (26) and (27) gives
15:
sN2 =
(
1 + µ+ T
2− γ
) 1
2
; tN2 =
(
1 + γ
2− µ− T
) 1
2
(28)
From (28), it can be seen that the amount of the transfer decided in the ﬁrst-stage
inﬂuences the optimal tariﬀs in the second-stage. In fact,
∂sN2
∂T
= 1
2(2−γ)
(
1+µ+T
2−γ
)− 1
2
>
0 and
∂tN2
∂T
= 1+γ
2(2−µ−T )2
(
1+γ
2−µ−T
)− 1
2
> 0. This result is very intuitive: since the
North makes a transfer to the South in the ﬁrst-stage, then it will raise its tariﬀ
to oﬀset the loss of utility caused by the transfer. Since the South anticipates the
North's behavior, it will also raise its tariﬀ in response to the North. Given that
aid increases both tariﬀs and that countries' utilities decrease with their partner's
tariﬀ, it is not optimal for the North to give any aid in ﬁrst place. As in the
15These tariﬀs look very much to KR (1988); the only diﬀerence is that I use a Stone-Geary
utility function, for which Nash tariﬀs exists for a corner solution (γ = µ = 1).
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static case, the Nash equilibrium is given by (25). These results are summarized
as follows:
Proposition 4: In a North-South two-stage game where the transfer (foreign
aid) is chosen in the ﬁrst stage, the optimal transfer given by the North to the
South is zero.
2.4.3 The Nash-bargaining over the transfer and the South's tariﬀ
In this section, I show that the North uses the allocation of the transfer to inﬂuence
the South's trade policy. To do so, I consider a Nash negotiation between the North
and the South over the amount of foreign aid and the South's tariﬀ, assuming
that the North already applies a free-trade trade policy. In other words, countries
bargain over the suﬃcient transfer that the North must give the South to encourage
a change in its foreign trade policy. The Nash social utility function can be written
as
maxUNS
t,T
≡ [(1 + xE) (1 + yE)− u (1, sN)] [(1 + x∗E) (1 + y∗E)− u∗ (1, sN)]
(29)
where u
(
1, sN
)
and u∗
(
1, sN
)
are respectively the North's and the South's
threat points obtained by introducing t = 1 and sN into their utility functions.
FOCs are respectively given by
∂UNS
∂t
=
[
∂xE
∂t
(
1 + yE
)
+
∂yE
∂t
(
1 + xE
)] [(
1 + x∗E
) (
1 + y∗E
)− u∗ (1, sN)]
+
[
∂x∗E
∂t
(
1 + y∗E
)
+
∂y∗E
∂t
(
1 + x∗E
)] [(
1 + xE
) (
1 + yE
)− u (1, sN)] (30)
∂UNS
∂T
=
[
∂xE
∂T
(
1 + yE
)
+
∂yE
∂T
(
1 + xE
)] [(
1 + x∗E
) (
1 + y∗E
)− u∗ (1, sN)]
+
[
∂x∗E
∂T
(
1 + y∗E
)
+
∂y∗E
∂T
(
1 + x∗E
)] [(
1 + xE
) (
1 + yE
)− u (1, sN)] (31)
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Solving the system of equations (30) and (31) gives the North's equilibrium
tariﬀ and foreign aid amount. Since working with values tN and sN proves ana-
lytically diﬃcult, I solve the system numerically for diﬀerent possible values of γ
and µ. Results are shown in table 4 below. As found in the previous section, both
tariﬀs increase with endowments. In addition, the South's trade war tariﬀ (Nash
tariﬀ) is higher than the North's for all γ < µ. However, the latter's welfare under
the trade war is higher than the South's. Comparing the trade war equilibrium to
free trade, it turns out that both countries are always better oﬀ under free trade
than under Nash tariﬀs, regardless of their sizes (endowments); actually, welfares
by the amount. This ﬁnding is at odds with KR (1988), who ﬁnd that a larger
country is better oﬀ under a tariﬀ war than free trade with its smaller trading
partner.16
The two last columns of table 4 gives the North's tariﬀ and the amount of aid
that the North is willing to give to the South to keep its welfare at its Nash level,
assuming that the South agrees to free trade policy.
Proposition 5: Starting from a situation where the North applies a free-trade
policy (t0 = 1) and the South, its optimal tariﬀ
(
s = sN
)
, the Nash-bargaining so-
lution is such that the optimal transfer (aid) is positive and the South adopts a
free trade policy. Moreover, the amount of the transfer increases with countries'
asymmetry in endowment size.
16These opposite results owe to the diﬀerence in countries' utility functions (Cobb-Douglas in
KR, 1988 vs. Stone-Geary in the present paper).
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Table 4: Tariﬀs and welfares as functions of endowments
Endowments Nash bargaining
Threat points Nash-bargaining solution (NBS)
γ µ u
(
sN , 1
)
u∗
(
sN , 1
)
sNBS T uNBS u∗NBS
0.6 0.6 2.246 2.253 1.0 0.002 2.247 2.254
0.6 0.7 2.393 2.109 1.0 0.005 2.394 2.110
0.6 0.8 2.543 1.970 1.0 0.009 2.546 1.972
0.6 0.9 2.697 1.837 1.0 0.013 2.701 1.840
0.6 1.0 2.855 1.709 1.0 0.018 2.860 1.713
0.7 0.7 2.232 2.263 1.0 0.010 2.235 2.266
0.7 0.8 2.376 2.121 1.0 0.015 2.379 2.124
0.7 0.9 2.522 1.984 1.0 0.020 2.527 1.989
0.7 1.0 2.673 1.852 1.0 0.026 2.680 1.858
0.8 0.8 2.210 2.279 1.0 0.023 2.216 2.285
0.8 0.9 2.349 2.138 1.0 0.030 2.357 2.146
0.8 1.0 2.492 2.003 1.0 0.037 2.502 2.012
0.9 0.9 2.178 2.302 1.0 0.041 2.188 2.313
0.9 1.0 2.314 2.163 1.0 0.050 2.326 2.175
1.0 1.0 2.136 2.332 1.0 0.066 2.153 2.349
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3 Empirical analysis
3.1 Methodology and data
In this remainder of this study, I investigate the empirical validity of proposition
3 presented in the previous section. For this purpose, I use ACP-EU data on
foreign aid, trade and tariﬀs. To test the theoretical predictions developed above,
I ﬁrst write an equation of the determinants of foreign aid based on equation (16).
Isolating T yields
T =
[1 + γ + 3t+ (2− γ) st]ZEy + [4 + γµ− 2 (γ + µ)] st− (1 + γ + µ+ γµ)
1 + µ− ZEy +
(
2− u− ZEy
)
st
(32)
Comparative statics analysis on (32) shows that the North's aid allocation to
the South unambiguously increases with its exports and its tariﬀ, but decreases
with endowments and the South's tariﬀ. Formally, ∂T
∂ZEy
> 0, ∂T
∂γ
< 0, ∂T
∂µ
< 0,
∂T
∂s
< 0, ∂T
∂t
> 0 and ∂T
∂(st)
> 0 (appendix); aid (T ) increases with donor exports(
ZEy
)
, the donor tariﬀ (t) and the geometric average tariﬀ (st), but decreases with
both country endowments and the recipient tariﬀ. The equation to be estimated
is given by
Tij = α0 + α1Z
E
yij
+ α2γj + α3µi + α4sjti + ij (33)
where Tij represents the amount of aid given by the donor i to the recipient
j and Zij is the recipient imports. Endowments γ and µ are measured by their
respective GDPs; sjti is the square of the geometrical average tariﬀ of any pair of
trading partners (here, a donor and a recipient), while ijt is the error term. α0,
α1, α2,α3, α4, α5 are unknown parameters to be estimated.
To capture the eﬀect of the asymmetry in endowment size, I replace γj and
µi in (34) by their ratio γj/µi, which is estimated by GDPj/GDPi. Then, I also
estimate this equation
Tij = α
′
0 + α
′
1Z
E
yij
+ α′2
γj
µi
+ α′3sjti + 
′
ij (34)
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Comparative statics for trade equations (15) and (16) reveal that aid and en-
dowments have a positive eﬀect on the donor exports, contrary to tariﬀs. Math-
ematically,
∂ZEy
∂T
> 0,
∂ZEy
∂γ
> 0,
∂ZEy
∂µ
> 0,
∂ZEy
∂s
< 0,
∂ZEy
∂t
< 0 and
∂ZEy
∂(st)
< 0; donor
imports are positively related to countries' endowments but negatively related to
aid and tariﬀs; it is veriﬁed that ∂Z
E
x
∂T
< 0, ∂Z
E
x
∂γ
> 0, ∂Z
E
x
∂µ
> 0, ∂Z
E
x
∂s
< 0, ∂Z
E
x
∂t
< 0
and
∂ZEy
∂(st)
< 0 (see appendix for derivations). Table 5 below summarizes the com-
parative statics for the three equations to be estimated.
Table 5. Comparative statics
Dependent Variables
Regressors T ZEy Z
E
x
ZEy +
T + -
γ _ + +
µ _ + +
s _ _ _
t + _ _
st + _ _
Trade equations are estimated by{
ZExij = β0 + β1T + β2γj + β3µi + β4sjti + εij
ZEyij = A0 +A1T +A2γj +A3µi +A4sjti + ιij
(35)
As with the aid equation, I assess the impact of recipient countries' relative size
on trade; (36) becomes{
ZExij = β
′
0 + β
′
1T + β
′
2
γj
µi
+ β
′
3sjti + ε
′
ij
ZEyij = A
′
0 +A′1T +A′2 γjµi +A
′
3sjti + ι
′
ij
(36)
Results are obtained by various estimation methods (OLS, Pooled OLS with
clustered robust standard errors (POLS), GLS random eﬀects (RE)); for trade
models, I also use the Poisson pseudo-maximum-likelihood (PPML) method de-
veloped by Santos Silva and Tenreyro (2006)). As it is common in aid and trade
literature, I consider diﬀerent speciﬁcations by adding dummy variables for colonial
ties and common language, whose coeﬃcients are expected to be positive. To ad-
dress the simultaneous causation between aid and trade (imports or exports), I use
one period lagged variables, which are considered good instruments, uncorrelated
with the error term (Anderson, 1979, p. 111; Wooldridge, 2000, p. 517).
I use the standard measure of foreign aid, namely Oﬃcial Development As-
sistance (ODA) given by oﬃcial agencies of the members of the Development
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Assistance Committee (DAC) to stimulate economic development and well-being
in the recipient countries. The trade and GDP data come from the UNCTAD
database (2012) available online. The data are measured in constant 2005 U.S.
dollars.17 Geometric average tariﬀ data comes from Duval and Utoktham (2011).
Colonial ties dummy data are taken from Head, Mayer and Ries (2010), while
the common language dummy comes from Santos Silva and Tenreyro (2006); this
source is supplemented with the online Encyclopédie Larousse for countries not
included in their sample. Lastly, the ethnolinguistic fractionalization (elf1 ) in-
dex is taken from Desmet, Ortuño-Ortin and Wacziarg (2012). The variable rel-
size_GDP is computed as the ratio of the ACP recipient's GDP to the EU donor's
GDP (GDP capACP/GDP capEU). Table 6 provides data summary statistics;
res_depend. measures a recipient's dependence on primary exports, and is the
ratio of an ACP primary exports to an EU donor to the ACP's GDP.
The analysis covers a panel of 60 ACP countries and 15 European donors. The
data set consists of 2868 observations of bilateral aid and trade ﬂows for the period
2005-2010. Since the focus of this study is on the determinants of foreign aid, only
observations with a positive net ODA have been included.
Table 6: Description of data used in the analysis
Variables N Mean Std. dev. Min Max
lnaid 2868 15.02 2.34 8.96 21.83
lnimports 2826 9.47 2.37 0.11 15.92
lnexports 2734 8.11 3.30 0.01 15.45
Gdp cap_ACP 2868 1399.14 2295.02 124.80 16552.13
Gdp cap_EU 2868 39170.93 13116.15 18131.26 88563.02
res_depend. 2544 0.006 0.015 8.92e-10 0.282
relsize_GDP 2868 0.040 0.070 0.001 0.639
g_av_tariﬀ 1533 1.125 0.070 1 1.300
elf1 2867 0.175 0.192 0 0.614
Colonial ties 2868 0.101 0.302 0 1
Language 2868 0.205 0.404 0 1
Notes: This table presents basic statistics for the variables used in the analysis.
The appendix contains sources and descriptions of the variables.
17Following Younas (2008), I use the unit value of the world import index to convert aid data
into constant US $ 2005.
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3.2 Results
I begin with the determinants of aid given by equation (35). Table 7 reports the
main estimation results. Column (1) is an OLS regression of log aid on a constant,
the log of ACP imports, the geometric average tariﬀ, a dummy variable for colo-
nial ties and the recipient relative size. The estimation shows a statistically and
economically signiﬁcant relationship between aid, on the one hand, and imports,
colonial ties and recipient relative size. The estimate suggests that ACP imports
have a modest impact on EU aid, compared to other factors. The coeﬃcient of
this variable is only 0.5. Colonial ties play a more important role in explaining aid
than imports, since its coeﬃcient is 1.27. Finally, the relative size variable appears
to be the most import determinant of aid allocation; its coeﬃcient is 13.2.
Column 2 presents the POLS estimates of the same equation. Coeﬃcients
are same as in column (1), although the standard errors are higher. However all
variables remain signiﬁcant at the same level. Moving from (P)OLS to Random
RE in column (3) reduces the estimated eﬀect of imports and the relative size.
The results now suggest that a smaller impact of ACP imports on EU aid (its
coeﬃcient is 0.3). The coeﬃcient of the relative size variable is also smaller (-
11.3). Colonial ties appear to have a higher impact on the EU aid allocation
to ACP; this suggests that looking at the aid-colonial ties nexus using (P)OLS
understates rather overstates the impact of colonial ties. Its coeﬃcient is 1.7.
Additional variables have been added in Column (4). Given the high corre-
lation between the common language dummy and colonial ties (0.66), the latter
is removed from the OLS estimation. The estimated eﬀect of ACP imports on
EU foreign aid on EU donors is higher (0.6) than columns (1) and (2), while the
impact of relative size is lower (-12.7). Having a common language seems not to
be a great motivation for EU donors as being an ex-colony is; its coeﬃcient is 0.7.
Multi-ethnic countries seem to receive more EU aid, while resource dependent ones
receive less; indeed, elf1 and res_depend. coeﬃcients are 0.1 and -0.2 respectively.
In both cases, they statistically insigniﬁcant.
In column (5), the relative size variable is broken into its two components,
namely Gdp cap_EU and Gdp cap_ACP . EU aid increases with the former, but
decreases with the latter. Recipient GDP per capita has been used in the literature
as an indicator of recipient needs (Feeny and McGillivray, 2008; Younas, 2008);
its eﬀect on aid is negative as expected, but marginal (-0.0003), while the relative
size measure proves to be the most important determinant of EU foreign aid.
Throughout all the regressions (1)-(5), imports, the recipient relative size and
colonial ties are very signiﬁcant at 1 percent level, contrary to the geometric av-
erage tariﬀ, which is insigniﬁcant. G_avg_tariﬀ has the expected sign in column
(3)-(5).
Table 8 reports the results of the trade equations (37) to which colonial ties
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have been added. Starting with A. EU exports to ACP, the POLS estimation in
column (1) shows that the relative size measure is the strongest determinant of
EU exports to ACP. This variable has a coeﬃcient of 9.2. Colonial ties seem to be
more export-promoting than EU aid; coeﬃcients of these variables are respectively
0.9 and 0.4. The geometric average tariﬀ has negative eﬀect on trade: the model
suggests that one percent increase of the tariﬀ reduces ACP imports by 4.8 percent.
Column (2) gives the RE estimates of the same equation, which lead to the
same conclusion. However, moving from POLS to RE decreases the estimated
impact of aid and the size index, while raising the eﬀect colonial ties. Coeﬃcients
of lnaid1, relsize_GDP and colonial ties are respectively 0.1, 6.1 and 1.8. Column
(3) gives the PPML estimate brings the same qualitative results. Compared to (1)
and (2), all variables are strongly signiﬁcant at 0.01 percent level; in the previous
estimation, the tariﬀ variable is signiﬁcant at 10 percent. Breaking down the size
index into two variables shows that EU imports increase with ACP GDP per capita,
but decreases with EU GDP per capita. Although coeﬃcients are very low, this
ﬁnding is very instructive of the fact that poor countries account for a small share
of rich countries' exports trade. Moreover, poor countries' consumption of rich
countries' products increases with their income. Compared to estimation (1), the
coeﬃcient of the tariﬀ variable has doubled, at the expense of the GDP measure.
The above observations are also valid for EU imports from ACP (table 8.B). It
is easily seen through estimations (5) to (8) that all variables tend to have higher
coeﬃcients compared to its corresponding equations (table 8.A). Comparing each
equation in B with its counterpart in A, it turns out that R-squared are very much
lower in the EU import equations than EU export equations.
Results obtained throughout this paper are robust to various estimation meth-
ods.
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Table 7. Dependent Variable: lnaid, 2005 to 2010.
(1) OLS (2) POLS (3) GLS-RE (4) OLS (5) OLS
lnimports1 0.515 *** 0.515 *** 0.318 *** 0.569 *** 0.565 ***
(0.028) (0.050) (0.043) (0.030) (0.030)
Gdp cap_EU 0.00003 ***
(5.18e-6)
Gdp cap_ACP -0.0004 ***
(0.00003)
relsize_GDP -13.211 *** -13.211 *** -11.268 *** -12.678 ***
(0.930) (1.850) (1.628) (0.966)
G_avg_tariﬀ -0.042 -0.042 0.115 1.105 1.144
(1.454) (2.418) (1.419) (1.521) (1.519)
Colonial ties 1.273 *** 1.273 *** 1.682 *** 1.258 ***
(0.176) (0.247) (0.261) (0.175)
Language 0.701 ***
(0.143)
elf1 0.009
(0.287)
res_depend. -0.220
(3.807)
Constant 10.642 *** 10.642 *** 12.258 *** 8.771 *** 7.606 ***
(1.712) (2.919) (1.787) (1.786) (1.884)
R-squared 0.35 0.35 0.37 0.33 0.36
Obs. (N) 1 210 1210 12010 1150 1 210
AIC 4 913.65 4 913.65 4688.37 4 896.81
Note: Estimated with heteroscedasticity-robust standard errors. Superscripts ***, **
and * indicate signiﬁcance 1, 5 and 10 % levels, respectively.
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4 Conclusion
The goal of this paper has been to shed light on diﬀerent types of transfers in a
North-South pure exchange model. I have shown that an eﬃcient trade agreement
(ETA) leads to free trade only if countries are symmetric. Contrary to conventional
wisdom, I ﬁnd that the ETA is such that the North subsidizes its imports, while
the South sets a tariﬀ higher than the Nash level when countries are asymmetric.
In this case, the South makes a transfer to the North to compensate for the loss.
This ﬁrst result shows that a transfer is equivalent to a compensation payment
when one trading partner loses in a trade agreement.
Once signed, the agreement needs to be self-enforcing in the absence of a supra-
national authority. Drawing from Limão and Saggi (2008, 2011), I show that the
WRP ﬁnes are higher for the small country (the South) than the large one (the
North) and increase with the asymmetry in endowment size. This ﬁnding sheds
light on a second type of transfer, which is actually a compensation payment for
infringement.
Finally, I consider another type of transfer, namely foreign aid. In trade lit-
erature, aid is given to promote donor exports and reforms in the South. In this
paper, I have shown that foreign aid serves as a device for the North to encourage
trade liberalization in the South and thus to establish global free trade.
It is widely believed that trade agreements between asymmetric countries only
beneﬁt small countries than large partners, as the agreements grant them access
to wide markets. My ﬁndings bring some qualiﬁcations to this view. As shown in
this article, the ETA causes a welfare loss in the North, while the FTA beneﬁts
both trading partners - contrary to most trade models in literature. It is worth
noting that large countries such the EU or the US are often the initiators of trade
agreements with their smaller partners, some of which are important suppliers of
primary products vital to their industries. Given the increasing competition from
emerging economies like China or India, the proliferation of commercial treaties
between the EU or the US with developing countries is, among other things, a
testimony of their raw material diplomacy. In fact, the EU and the US seek to
secure access to raw materials by eliminating export restrictions.
The systematic analysis of transfers presented in this paper is based on a North-
South pure exchange model which abstracts from the supply-side of the economy by
assuming some given endowments of goods. Moreover, both countries are assumed
to have similar demand functions. Empirical facts suggest that countries diﬀer
in their supply capacities and their demands, which inevitably aﬀect trade. A
promising avenue for future research would be to take into account heterogeneity
in demand and supply within a trade agreement model and examine its eﬀects on
trade, countries' welfare and transfers.
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5 Appendix
5.1 The 15 European-DAC donors in the sample
Austria Germany Netherlands
Belgium Greece Portugal
Denmark Ireland Spain
Finland Italy Sweden
France Luxembourg United Kingdom
5.2 The 61 Aid recipient countries from ACP in the sample
Angola Djibouti Liberia Sierra Leone
Antigua and Barbuda Dominican Republic Madagascar South Africa
Barbados Equatorial Guinea Malawi Sudan
Belize Eritrea Mali Suriname
Benin Ethiopia Mauritania Swaziland
Botswana Fiji Mauritius Togo
Burkina Faso Gabon Mozambique Trinidad ad Tobago
Burundi Gambia Namibia Uganda
Cameroon Ghana Niger United Republic of Tanzania
Cape Verde Guinea Nigeria Vanuatu
Central African Republic Guinea-Bissau Papua New Guinea Zambia
Chad Guyana Rwanda Zimbabwe
Comoros Haiti Saint Lucia
Congo Jamaica Sao Tome and Principe
Côte d'Ivoire Kenya Senegal
Dem. Rep. of the Congo Lesotho Seychelles
5.3 Data sources
Variables Data source
Net aid from 15- EU DAC member World Development Indicators (WBI, 2011), online access
countries of OECD at http://data.worldbank.org/indicator
GDP UNCTADSTAT (2012), online access at http://unctadstat.unctad.org
Imports UNCTADSTAT (2012), online access at http://unctadstat.unctad.org
Exports UNCTADSTAT (2012), online access at http://unctadstat.unctad.org
G_avg_tariﬀ Duval and Utoktham (2011)
Colonial ties Table A.4 of Head, Mayer and Ries (2010)
Common language Table A.2 of Santos Silva and Tenreyro (2006)
supplemented with the Encyclopédie Larousse, online
Ethnolinguistic fractionalization (ELF1) Desmet, K., Ortuño-Ortin, I. and Wacziarg, R. (2012)
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